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1 Introduction
Pension entitlements can be affected by interrupted labor market careers, and pension systems are typ-
ically not designed to fully offset shocks affecting individual work careers (OECD, 2015). Retirement
income is tightly linked to past earnings history, and unwilling displacement from the labor market may
therefore lead to a negative wealth shock in terms of lost pension entitlements. In many OECD coun-
tries, late-career job displacement may even lead to individuals losing the ability to retire early or at the
same terms as full-career workers.1 While late-career job displacement already has severe implications
for individual welfare, the loss of pension entitlements adds an additional element of reduced individ-
ual welfare that may have implications for job-seeking effort or enrollment onto other social security
programs.
The main contribution of this paper is to assess the economic implications of access to early re-
tirement benefits for elderly displaced workers. In particular, we study (i) the adverse effects on re-
employment rates, (ii) benefit substitution onto other social security benefits and (iii) the associated
implications on policy and welfare. A sharp eligibility criterion in the Norwegian early retirement pro-
gram (AFP) facilitates our study.2 Before 2011, workers in private sector firms covered by the AFP
scheme could claim early retirement benefits from the age of 62, but in order to be eligible, workers
had to be employed by the firm at the date of claiming. A job displacement before an individual cut-
off date therefore implied that the individual did not qualify for AFP benefits, provided between ages
62–67 years. This allows us to employ a regression discontinuity design to study causal effects of early
retirement provision for various outcomes, by comparing workers who lost their job just too soon to be
eligible versus workers who just retained their eligibility. To identify job displacements, we use data
on bankruptcies among Norwegian private sector firms between 2001–2010 which helps avoid poten-
tial endogeneity problems of workers voluntarily leaving a firm.3 Combined with high-quality data on
matched employer-employee relationships and take-up of various social security benefits from tax reg-
isters, this allows us to study effects of early retirement eligibility on re-employment rates, earnings,
and benefit substitution between ages 62–67. We focus in particular on substitution towards disability
insurance (DI) and unemployment insurance (UI). Furthermore, we explore the welfare implications and
the financial costs for the state.
Our main empirical findings can be summarized by the following conclusions. First, we do not find
evidence of eligibility for early retirement harming re-employment rates among workers in our sample.
We estimate that re-employment rates among workers who are displaced just before becoming eligible
for AFP are only 2 percentage points lower than among workers who are displaced just after becoming
eligible, with the point estimate being statistically insignificant. Our corresponding estimate on labor
market earnings is similarly small and insignificant and suggests that early retirement eligibility de-
creases labor market earnings between ages 62–67 by $5,600, or about 9 percent. Second, we find clear
evidence of program substitution, and in particular increased enrollment onto the DI program among in-
eligible workers. The fraction of workers who are displaced just before becoming eligible for AFP and
1Some examples are Austria, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Korea, Norway, the Slovak Republic, Sweden, Chile, Mexico and
Germany (OECD, 2015).
2The early retirement program in Norway is known by its acronym AFP from Norwegian “Avtalefestet pensjon”.
3For job displacements due to bankruptcies, an additional rule referred to as the “52-week-rule” pushed back this threshold
to 61 years of age, plus the standard notice period, which may be some period from 1–6 months depending on tenure and age
of the worker. This means that the relevant cut-off for workers experiencing a bankruptcy is individual-specific and may be
some time between 60 years and 6 months to 60 years and 11 months. The details of this will be outlined in Section 2.
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claim DI before reaching the general retirement age of 67 years is about 48 percent, compared to just 12
percent among workers who just retain AFP eligibility. The increase in DI claiming of 36 percentage
points among the ineligible is highly statistically significant. We further estimate that of the $61,600 in
lost AFP benefits among the ineligible, $42,500 is replaced by non-pension public transfers, where about
$31,400 is increased take-up of DI benefits and $7,700 is increased take-up of UI benefits. This is equiv-
alent to a replacement of 69 percent of the lost benefits with other non-pension social security benefits,
where about half of the lost AFP benefits are replaced with DI.4 Third, there is substantial heterogeneity
in benefit substitution behavior among workers in our sample. Benefit substitution is largest for workers
with low earnings, workers with low educational attainment and workers in the manufacturing industry.
Fourth, we find that the increase in public expenditures of providing early retirement benefits is modest.
Our point estimate suggests that the increase in overall costs amounts to $7,200 for each worker per
annum, and at the 95% confidence level, our findings suggest that the increase is at most $16,400.
We emphasize that our findings should be interpreted with some caution. As the composition of
workers in the private sector with access to AFP is heavily skewed towards male workers (more than 75
percent), and bankruptcies occur more commonly in the manufacturing industry (about 68 percent of all
bankruptcies) where workers typically have low educational attainment, our main findings are mainly
driven by workers with these characteristics. We do not find evidence of increased take-up of DI for
workers in non-manufacturing professions whose bankruptcy occurred before their individual age cut-
off, but we do find substitution towards UI for these workers. Moreover, we do not find distinguishable
differences between workers with high educational attainment who reach the eligibility threshold and
those who do not.
To investigate the welfare implications of early retirement provision for elderly displaced workers,
we assess disposable income among workers in our sample who were eligible for AFP and those who
were not. We do not find clear evidence of disposable income being higher among the eligible on
average, with a statistically insignificant point estimate of about $3,800 per annum, or about 12 percent
higher than among the ineligible. However, this exercise does not necessarily capture the full picture,
and in particular whether some ineligible individuals are significantly worse off. Therefore, we extend
our exercise and investigate distributional impacts in a standard Imbens & Rubin (1997) framework, and
assess the distribution of disposable income depending on eligibility status. While we do find evidence
of disposable income being more dispersed among the ineligible, the difference in the lower part of
the distribution is small. This suggests that few individuals in our sample were significantly worse off
when being ineligible for early retirement benefits, and that most ineligible individuals who were not
re-employed got some type of social security benefit.
We believe our analysis is of general interest for three main reasons. First, economic hardship
throughout the OECD may lead to increased job displacements and decreased labor demand, and in
particular for elderly workers who are usually less attractive hires.5 Second, many countries have im-
plemented early retirement schemes to provide more flexible withdrawal opportunities from the labor
market and to reduce enrollment onto other social security programs, but these programs have also
turned out to be very costly. We are able to shed light on a particularly large shock to early retirement
4Regarding the very high substitution onto DI, we emphasize that on average about 23 percent claim DI at some point
between ages 62–67 in the population, while among those who experience a late-career job displacement and at the same time
do not reach eligibility, about 48 percent claim DI at some point between ages 62–67.
5See e.g. Heyma et al. (2014); Vigtel (2018).
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entitlements, as losing eligibility for AFP leads to the loss of the entire early retirement option, or the
equivalent of five years of benefits. We are also able to account for the outcomes in the entire early retire-
ment period for our sample individuals, meaning that we can fully account for the employment effects in
the period of interest and the potential program substitution. Third, many countries are debating whether
parts of the social security system in general must undergo reforms to uphold fiscal sustainability. This
may lead to the use of prescriptions such as eligibility tightening or benefit cuts, prescriptions to which
we provide evidence to policymakers’ knowledge about potential gains and harms.
Our paper is primarily related to the literature focused on the effects of extended UI for elderly work-
ers. Closest to our paper is a few studies which have shown that extended UI benefits discourages job
searching and prolongs unemployment spells, and may even bridge the gap to retirement.6 Inderbitzin
et al. (2016) showed that extended UI have strong effects on labor market exit through early retirement,
and increased exit through the DI channel. Kyyrä & Ollikainen (2008) used a reform in Finland which
increased the eligibility age for extended UI from 53 to 55 and later in Kyyrä & Pesola (2020) from 55
to 57 to study the effects on early retirement and labor supply, respectively. Kyyrä & Ollikainen (2008)
documented a decrease in early retirement from the first increase in access age, while Kyyrä & Pesola
(2020) documented increased employment over the remainder of the working career, and no substitution
onto other programs. In contrast to the literature on extended UI, our study consists of workers very
close to the general retirement age. We contribute to this literature by studying effects of having the op-
tion to retire early, and thus exiting the labor market entirely, which we argue may have fundamentally
different implications than extended UI spells.
Our paper is also related to the literature on early retirement programs and changes to the minimum
legal retirement age on labor supply and program substitution (e.g. Geyer & Welteke, 2017; Manoli
& Weber, 2016; Staubli & Zweimüller, 2013 among others). Their common finding is that increas-
ing the retirement age increases employment, but evidence on program substitution is mixed. Hernæs
et al. (2016) used a recent Norwegian reform of the pension system which gave workers more flexible
withdrawal opportunities, while Johnsen et al. (2020) used the introduction of the Norwegian early re-
tirement program, essentially studying a reduction in the legal retirement age. Their common finding is
that workers tend to decrease take-up of DI benefits in response to greater flexibility of the retirement
program. Vigtel (2018) showed, on the labor demand side, that decreasing the minimum legal retire-
ment age in Norway for a subset of workers leads to risk-averse firms becoming more willing to hire
senior workers. While most of these studies are focused on the spillover effects between two programs
or their employment effects, our paper broadly investigates the spillover effect onto the entire spectrum
of social security programs that the elderly workers may be eligible for. In that sense, we contribute to
the literature by broadening the scope of program substitution.
Another broad branch of the literature is focused on the effects of tightening policies regarding
eligibility for social benefits and their effect on employment rates and program substitution. Borghans
et al. (2014) studied how stricter criteria for access to DI in the Netherlands affected enrollment onto
other social insurance programs, and found that individuals disqualifying for DI offset about 30 percent
of the lost benefits in take-up of other social benefits. Similarly, Karlstrom et al. (2008) found that
stricter eligibility criteria for DI in Sweden increased take-up of UI and sickness benefits, but that it did
6While this literature is often interested in the push and pull factors of UI systems for older workers into unemployment
(e.g. Tuit & van Ours, 2010 and Baugelin & Remillon, 2014), we do not explore this margin in our paper.
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not influence employment rates. Staubli (2011) suggests that increasing the minimum age of relaxed DI
access in Austria only had a slight positive effect on employment rates, but a significant decline in DI
enrollment. Our study echoes these studies regarding the importance of assessing program substitution
when considering policy changes to social security programs.
Finally, our paper is related to an extensive literature on the effects of job displacement (e.g. Ja-
cobson et al., 1993; Lassus et al., 2015; Marmora & Ritter, 2015; Ichino et al., 2017; Huttunen et al.,
2018 among others). Common findings for these studies are large adverse effects on earnings and em-
ployment, both in the short and long run. Particularly relevant for our study is Bratsberg et al. (2013),
who used data on Norwegian bankruptcies and showed that a large fraction DI claims can be attributed
to job displacements. They found that non-participation in the labor market is significantly affected by
exogenous changes in employment opportunities. Marmora & Ritter (2015) found that unemployment
late in workers’ careers affects retirement timing, and that the effect is stronger once the workers become
eligible for social security benefits. Recently, Ichino et al. (2017) showed that old and young workers
face similarly large displacement costs in terms of long-run employment, but older workers lose con-
siderably more initially and gains later. While our study does not primarily focus on the effects of job
displacement, we show how an outside option for displaced workers affects re-employment rates and
enrollment onto social security programs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we present an overview of the Norwegian
early retirement program, and briefly provide an overview of the related public transfer systems in
Section 2. Then, in Section 3, we present the administrative data that we use, while in Section 4 we
lay out our empirical strategy. In Section 5 we present our main results. In Section 6 we present a fuzzy
RD as an extension of our main results. In Section 7 we assess the implications of our findings for policy
and welfare. Finally, we conclude in Section 8.
2 Institutional setting
Our focus lies on elderly workers in private sector firms covered by the early retirement program (AFP)
who experience a job displacement due to bankruptcy of the firm they work in. The institutional back-
ground information therefore includes an overview of the AFP program and the eligibility criteria in-
cluding particular rules concerning firm bankruptcies. We also provide a brief overview of other social
security programs that workers may be eligible for, and in particular the disability insurance (DI) pro-
gram and the unemployment insurance (UI) program.
2.1 Early retirement (AFP)
The AFP program was introduced in 1988. For public sector workers, there has been full coverage since
the introduction, while about half of private sector workers have been covered since the introduction,
although the rate has increased somewhat over time. For private sector firms, membership is voluntary
and requires a centrally negotiated collective pay agreement. For member firms, employees are enrolled
regardless of their individual union memberships. The AFP is partially funded by the government, and
partially funded through payments by member firms. Until November 2010, the AFP offered enrolled
workers a full pension claim starting from age 62, whereas the normal retirement age through the Na-
tional Insurance Scheme was 67 years.7
7When the system was first introduced, the minimum claiming age was set to 66 years, but the limit has since been reduced
in four steps. The final reduction of the minimum legal claiming age happened in 1998, and all our possible claimants became
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Eligibility criteria The AFP system imposed a sharp lock-in (or lock-out) mechanic. Workers had to
be working in the same firm covered by the AFP for the last three years before claiming benefits, or in
any firm in the same sector covered by AFP for the last five years with the last two years being in one
firm.8 Furthermore, the firm had to employ at least two workers not counting the owner of the firm. At
the day of claiming benefits, the worker had to be employed by the firm, and the first possible claiming
time is the beginning of the month after reaching age 62. Workers’ salary had to be at least equivalent
to approximately $10,000 (in 2015 dollars) in annual earnings, with this firm being the worker’s main
employer. Finally, claiming AFP benefits could not be combined with claiming DI benefits.
There was an exception made in the case of mass-layoffs or bankruptcy. If the work relation was
terminated because of either of these events, the worker retained the AFP membership for 52 weeks
after the day of the incident plus the duration of the standard notice period. The standard notice period is
governed by the Norwegian Work Environment Act and is a mapping based on tenure and the worker’s
age, where the shortest notice period is 1 month and the longest is 6 months.9 This means that a worker
who lost the job due to bankruptcy or mass-layoff essentially could retain the membership for up to 18
months after the incident.
Benefits levels The AFP benefit level was a mapping from the old-age pension benefit that the worker
would receive from the National Insurance Scheme given pension claiming at age 67. The old-age
pension benefit level received at age 67 was unaffected by claiming AFP. We provide a detailed overview
of how old-age benefits were calculated in Appendix B. Additionally, claimants received an “AFP top-
up”, which was a flat rate of about $2,300.10 Claimants were subject to a pro-rata earnings test on
continued work above a very small tolerance level, essentially implying a marginal tax-rate on continued
work close to 100 percent for those who claimed AFP. Average annual benefits amounted to about
$24,000 in 2001 and approximately $27,000 in 2010. The average benefit levels were significantly
higher for men than for women. In 2001, the average benefit for men was $27,000 and for women
$22,000 while in 2010 the average benefit for men was $31,000 and for women $24,000.
2.2 Other social security benefits
Disability insurance For those deemed to have permanent reduced earnings capacity due to illness
or injury, disability insurance (DI) benefits replaces parts of the past earnings that are lost due to the
reduced capacity. This benefit may be partial, depending on the residual earnings capacity. To be eligible
for disability benefits, an individual must be between 18–67 years old and have been a member of the
National Insurance Scheme in the last three years before becoming disabled. Illness or injury must
be the main reason why the earnings capacity has been reduced, appropriate vocational rehabilitation
measures must have been completed and the earnings capacity must be permanently reduced by at least
50 percent.11 In the time period we consider in this paper, the benefit level was equivalent to the old-age
eligible after this year, unifying our minimum legal claiming age for AFP to 62 years of age. The structure of the AFP,
including some of the rules governing eligibility, was changed in 2011, a reform that does not affect our sample as workers in
our cohorts spanning from 1939–1948 were entirely covered by the old rules.
8For instance, switching jobs between private and public sector firms just before retirement would lead to loss of eligibility
for AFP benefits, even if both the private and the public firm were covered by AFP.
9The exact mapping from age and tenure to the notice period is displayed in Equation (2) in Section 4.
10In 2015 dollars. Throughout the paper, we measure monetary values in 2015 dollars given an average exchange rate of
NOK/USD = 9.
11Under some criteria, DI may be given even though the earnings capacity is reduced by less than 50 percent; if the worker
is currently on the work assessment allowance program, 40 percent is sufficient, and if the reduced earnings capacity is due to
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pension benefit, and therefore almost equivalent to AFP benefits (the difference was equivalent to the
"AFP top-up" of $2,300 per annum). Individuals allowed DI were subject to an earnings test implying a
marginal tax rate of about 60 percent if earnings exceeded about $10,000.12
Unemployment benefits To be eligible for unemployment benefits, a person must be a registered job-
seeker at the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration. A person whose working hours have been
reduced by at least half, is a genuine job-seeker, a member of the National Insurance Scheme, a legal
resident, and has had at least $15,000 of income in the previous calendar year or $30,000 combined over
the past three calendar years may apply for unemployment benefits. If the pre-unemployment income
exceeded $20,000, the recipient may receive unemployment benefits for up to 104 weeks, while if it was
lower than $20,000, the longest period is 52 weeks. A recipient of unemployment benefits is entitled to
62.4 percent of the past earnings. The past earnings are either the last 12 months before unemployment,
or the annual average of the last 36 months if this exceeds the former.
Other public transfers Besides disability and unemployment insurance, workers in our sample may
also be eligible for various other social security benefits. One particularly relevant program for elderly
workers is sickness benefits which is intended as replacement of income loss due to short-term sick-
ness (up to one year) for workers engaged in employment who are members of the National Insurance
Scheme. A full sickness benefit fully replaces the earnings in the past year. Although less relevant for
elderly individuals than for prime-age workers, workers in our sample may also be eligible for temporary
DI benefits. While the temporary DI program has undergone several changes during our sample period,
the program’s main intention has been to provide financial support in periods when the person is ill or
injured but attempt to return to work. Temporary DI was provided for up to 1–4 years during our sample
period for most individuals.13 Additionally, individuals in our sample may also be eligible for a few less
relevant benefits such as social assistance and child support.
3 Data and sample selection
In our empirical analysis we use data from two main sources that can be linked by unique and anonymized
identifiers for every resident individual and employer. The main data we use is provided by Statis-
tics Norway (SSB) and contains detailed information about individual characteristics and employer-
employee relationships, including exact dates of each relationship. This allows us to construct monthly
data on earnings and employment for each individual and firm. The employer-employee data also
contains information on firm characteristics, including 5-digit industry codes and the exact date of
bankruptcy (if such a date exists). Thus, we are able to identify individuals who work in firms experi-
encing a bankruptcy. Our second source of data is provided by Fellesordningen for AFP, and includes
information about exact dates on each firm’s affiliation to the AFP-scheme.14 This allows us to identify
an approved occupational illness or injury, 30 percent is sufficient.
12Every dollar in earnings were earnings tested if earnings exceeded this threshold. After 2005, only the earnings above the
threshold were earnings tested if the individual was allowed DI in 2003 or earlier.
13Before 2010, temporary DI consisted of three separate programs: Rehabilitation benefits (up to 1 or 2 years), occupational
rehabilitation benefits (no upper time constraint) and time-constrained DI benefits (up to 5 years). In March 2010, these
programs were replaced with the Work Assessment Allowance program that provided benefits to individuals for up to 4 years
as a general rule.
14Fellesordningen for AFP is the largest private sector organization for AFP schemes and almost the entire market.
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whether individuals are eligible for AFP based on their employment relationship which is crucial for our
analysis. For our main outcome variables, we use annual data on earnings and social security transfers
from reported tax-records (SSB). The data we use contains years 1999–2014.
The administrative nature of our data reduces the extent of measurement errors in income variables
and employment relationships. Because individual employment affiliation and income variables are
third-party reported (i.e. by employers and the tax authorities), the coverage and reliability are rated as
exceptional by international quality assessments (see e.g. Atkinson et al., 1995). Since administrative
data are a matter of public record, there is no attrition due to non-response or non-consent by individuals
or firms, and individuals can only exit these data sets due to natural attrition (death or out-migration).
3.1 Sample selection
In our empirical analysis, our main estimation sample considers workers aged 59–61 years when the firm
experiences a bankruptcy. The upper age restriction is set to avoid selection bias. As workers in affiliated
firms are eligible for AFP benefits from the age of 62, we ensure that individuals in our estimation sample
have not yet made their decision to retire early. The lower age restriction ensures that we have roughly
18 months of bandwidth on each side of the cut-off in our RD analysis. A potential worry in our setting
is that firms may lay off workers before the actual bankruptcy occurs. Another worry is that workers
may anticipate that their job is at risk and leave early. To avoid such selection of workers, our main
estimation sample includes those workers who were employed in a firm with AFP affiliation 24 months
prior to the bankruptcy date of the firm. Thus, we also pre-determine worker and firm characteristics
to this initial point in time (when workers are 57–59 years of age). While our estimates appear to be
very stable across different specifications of when we pre-determine work affiliation, we test alternative
samples of workers with pre-determined affiliation 12 months and 1 month before the bankruptcy dates
of firms as robustness checks.
Additionally, we do the following sample restrictions due to the eligibility criteria of the AFP pro-
gram presented in Section 2.1. One of the requirements states that individuals must work at least 3
consecutive years in the same firm with AFP affiliation. To be eligible for AFP at the age of 62, we
therefore require that individuals started their employment relationship before the month of when indi-
viduals turned 59 years. We also require that the specific employment relationship was each individual’s
main employer (the one with the highest earnings) if the individual had more than one employer, as only
the main employment relationship was considered for eligibility. Third, we require that individuals did
not participate in the DI program, as recipients of this program were ineligible for AFP benefits. Fourth,
we require that firms have at least 2 employees as workers were considered ineligible if there were no
other employees at the firm. Fifth, we require that individuals worked at least 20 percent of a full-time
position, which translates to roughly $10,000 in annual earnings to meet the final eligibility criteria for
AFP.
Even though our data contains information on registered firm bankruptcies, some of the firms may
get new owners and keep a share of the workforce, leading to few or no job displacements despite
the original firm being bankrupt. As we are interested in workers who in fact do experience a job
displacement, we therefore follow previous studies (see e.g. Jacobson et al., 1993; Rege et al., 2009;
Huttunen et al., 2011; Basten et al., 2016), imposing a restriction on the fraction of workers (including
younger workers not in our estimation sample) who from the month of the bankruptcy to 12 months post-
bankruptcy work in the same firm. In our baseline specification, we set our threshold to 1/3 meaning
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that if more than 1/3 of all workers in the bankruptcy firm (excluding “self”15) work in the same firm
12 months after the bankruptcy, it is considered a “spurious bankruptcy” and the entire firm is dropped
from our initial estimation sample. We do, however, include these firms in an alternative sample as a
robustness check.
As our data spans from 1999, our main estimation sample includes bankruptcies in private sector
AFP-firms during January 2001–November 2010 and cohorts 1939–1948.16 This means that for firms
with a bankruptcy occurring in 2001, our workers must be employed by the firm in 1999. As our data
spans to 2014 we are able to follow individuals during the entire early retirement period until they reach
the standard retirement age of 67 years.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
In Table 1 we present summary statistics for individuals aged 57–59 years who work in a private sector
firm. The first two columns include our main estimation sample of individuals who worked in a private
sector firm with AFP affiliation 24 months before the bankruptcy. The third and fourth columns include
workers in bankruptcy firms without AFP affiliation which we use as a placebo sample in the empirical
analysis. The fifth and sixth columns include workers who worked in private sector firms that did not
become bankrupt, which we use as a comparison sample in our analyses.
There are some noteworthy differences between our main estimation sample of workers in bankruptcy
firms with AFP affiliation and the other private sector firms that do not become bankrupt, particularly
for industries. The firms in our estimation sample are far more likely to be in the manufacturing sector,
while the workers are more likely to be male workers and have slightly lower earnings on average. Firms
are also somewhat smaller compared to the other private sector firm. Otherwise, workers share fairly
similar characteristics.
15For instance, the workers in a firm with 10 employees which ends up bankrupt is “spurious” if n > (10− 1)/3 works in
the same firm a year after the bankruptcy, where the one subtracted is “self”.
16We restrict our attention to bankruptcies occurring before the 2011 Norwegian pension reform for two reasons; the reform
changed the rules regarding eligibility and work incentives for individuals claiming AFP benefits. While workers in our sample
could in principle become eligible for AFP benefits under the new scheme following the reform, individuals in our sample had
to postpone claiming after the initial claiming month when turning 62 years, and had to be re-employed in a firm with AFP
affiliation to satisfy the new eligibility criteria. Only 3% of our sample claim AFP benefits under the new scheme, compared
to 37% claiming before the reform.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of private sector workers aged 57-59 years
Bankruptcy samples Comparison sample
Main est. sample: Placebo sample: All private
AFP workers Non-AFP workers sector workers
Individual characteristics: mean sd mean sd mean sd
Age 58.0 (.84) 58.0 (.82) 58.0 (.82)
Fraction females .23 .29 .33
Fraction married .75 .72 .76
Years of education 10.8 (1.7) 11.2 (2.2) 11.4 (2.3)
Number of children 2.0 (1.2) 2.3 (1.1) 2.2 (1.1)
Wealth ($1,000) 89 (95) 94 (107) 119 (123)
Labor market characteristics:
Monthly earnings ($1,000) 4.1 (1.8) 3.9 (2.1) 4.9 (2.3)
Fraction full time employment .91 .87 .87
Tenure (years) 8.8 (8.7) 6.1 (6.8) 10.9 (8.9)
Number of employees 84 (127) 11 (13) 157 (315)
Fraction receiving sickness benefits .11 .11 .08
Local DI rate .10 (.03) .10 (.03) .10 (.03)
Local unemployment rate .02 (.01) .02 (.01) .02 (.01)
Industry (%):
Primary sector 1.2 3.1 4.3
Manufacturing 68.1 18.8 30.0
Construction 10.3 14.0 8.5
Wholesale retail and trade 13.3 37.6 25.8
Transportation and storage 1.2 7.5 9.2
Scientific and legal activities 1.2 5.1 6.5
Other 4.7 14.0 15.7
Number of firms 177 511 48,451
Number of individuals 339 591 141,122
Notes: Bankruptcy samples include individuals aged 57–59 years who work in a private sector firm 24 months before the firm’s bankruptcy
date. Comparison sample includes individuals aged 57–59 years who work in a private sector firm (excluding bankruptcies). All samples
include firms with at least 2 employees, individuals not on disability insurance, cohorts 1939–1948 and years 1999–2008. Firm must be each
individual’s main employer (with the highest earnings if more than 1 employer). Local DI and unemployment are measured at the municipality
level. Earnings and wealth are measured in 2015 dollars (NOK/USD = 9).
4 Empirical framework
This section first presents the assignment rule that creates local random variation in eligibility for early
retirement (AFP). We then present the regression discontinuity design that we use to identify effects of
early retirement eligibility and discuss threats to identification.
Assignment variable As our proxy for job displacements comes from bankruptcies, our assignment
variable is based on the age of individual i at the time of the bankruptcy of the firm. As explained
in Section 2.1, individuals are in normal cases eligible for AFP from the age of 62, but in the case of
bankruptcies, workers are granted an additional 52 weeks plus the individual notice period. Hence, our
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assignment variable (measured in months) is defined as:
ai = agei − (61−NPi) (1)
where agei is individual i’s age at the bankruptcy date and NPi is the notice period (in months) of
individual i, which is governed by the Norwegian Work Environment Act, according to:
NPi = 1+Ti,5 +Ti,10(1+ Ii,50 + Ii,55 + Ii,60) (2)
where Ti,y is a dummy equal to one if individual i has at least y years of tenure and Ii,ā is a dummy equal
one if individual i is at least as old as age ā. The relationship implies that individuals in our sample
have a notice period of 1–6 months depending on age and tenure. If ai is positive (negative), then the
firm went bankrupt sufficiently late (too early) and individual i is initially eligible (ineligible) for AFP
benefits.
4.1 Regression discontinuity design
In our RD design, assignment to eligibility is a deterministic function of the assignment variable a,
the age at bankruptcy including each individual’s notice period as defined in Equations (1) and (2).
Individuals are initially eligible for AFP if a ≥ 0. The regression model for our reduced form RD model
can be summarized by the following equations:
yit = αl + fl(ai)+δXit + εit if ai < 0 (3)
yit = αr + fr(ai)+δXit + εit if ai ≥ 0 (4)
β = αl −αr (5)
where yit denotes the outcome of individual i at time t, Xit is a set of covariates, εit is the error term and fl
and fr are unknown functional forms of the assignment variable on each side of the cut-off respectively.
The reduced form RD estimate is given by β , the difference between the intercepts of each side of the
cut-off.
In our baseline specification, we follow Lee & Lemieux (2010) and use a local linear regression with
separate linear trends and a rectangular kernel density on each side of the cut-off. While we consider
multiple outcome variables in our analyses, we keep our bandwidth fixed in our baseline specifications.
Although different outcomes have different optimal bandwidths, we choose a bandwidth of 12 months
(of age) which is in the neighborhood of the optimal bandwidth suggested by Imbens & Kalyanaraman
(2012) for two of our key outcome variables AFP benefits and (total) social security benefits. We also
show that our estimates are relatively stable to bandwidth selection in Section 5.4.
4.2 Threats to identification
The validity of our RD design requires that individuals are not able to precisely manipulate the assign-
ment variable, which in our setting is their age at the bankruptcy date. As individuals cannot manipulate
age, the only possible way to manipulate the assignment variable is manipulation of the bankruptcy
date itself. While we consider this is highly implausible, we carry out the standard validity checks for
RD designs. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the assignment variable around the cut-off. Because
our assignment variable is discrete, we follow Frandsen (2017) and perform a formal statistical test for
11
bunching on either side of the cut-off. Reassuringly, the test is unable to reject the null of no bunching.
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     p-value density test: .332
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of age (in months; defined as in Equation (1)) around the individual AFP eligibility cut-off. P-value
is calculated using the discrete density test of Frandsen (2017). The sample consists of individuals employed by a firm with AFP affiliation
24 months before the firm’s bankruptcy date who satisfied the initial AFP eligibility criteria (see details in Section 3.1). The sample includes
bankruptcies between 2001–2010 and workers aged 59–61 years at the firm’s bankruptcy date.
If individuals are unable to manipulate the assignment variable, any pre-determined covariate should
have the same distribution on either side, close to the cut-off. As a formal test, we run RD regressions
with our baseline specifications on worker characteristics as the dependent variable, each measured 24
months prior to the bankruptcy. The point estimates and standard errors are reported in Appendix Table
A.1. We also present these results graphically in Appendix Figure A.1. Reassuringly, key covariates
such as monthly earnings, tenure, and the number of employees in each firm appear smooth around the
cut-off and are insignificant at all conventional levels. One exception is the local DI rate (measured at
the municipality level) which is significant at the 5% level. However, based on the large number of
covariates that we consider, the probability of observing changes in one covariate around the cut-off
is quite large. Additionally, the correlations between the local DI rate and the outcome variables we
consider are very small and close to zero. When we perform a joint test for all covariates, we cannot
reject the null of no manipulation at any conventional level as reported in Appendix Table A.1.
4.3 Interpretation of estimates
While a significant share of the workers are indeed displaced when their respective employer becomes
bankrupt, not everyone is displaced at this point in time. As our main estimation sample consists of
workers 24 months prior to the bankruptcy, some workers may be displaced or leave the firm for other
reasons before the actual bankruptcy. While we impose this restriction to avoid selection, workers may
still lose eligibility for AFP despite being initially eligible. Additionally, some workers may not be
displaced at all as new owners may keep a share of the workforce in the event of a takeover, while other
workers may become re-employed by a different employer. These individuals may become eligible for
AFP at a later stage despite being initially ineligible. While we cannot perfectly distinguish between the
firms that get new owners (“takeover firms”) and other firms, we can investigate the overall employment
rates around bankruptcy date of the initial employer.
Figure 2 shows the monthly employment rates for our main estimation sample of AFP-workers
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around the bankruptcy of the firm. In panel 2a, we plot the fraction of workers employed by the
bankruptcy firm. While everyone was employed 24 months prior to bankruptcy by construction, just over
60 percent of workers were still employed by the firm in the month of bankruptcy. This indicates that
a significant share of workers either left early or that the actual lay-off occurred before the bankruptcy
date. There were very few who were still employed by the firm in the months after bankruptcy. In panel
2b, we plot the fraction of workers who were employed by any firm around the bankruptcy date of the
original firm. Around 80 percent of workers were still employed in the month of bankruptcy, while
around 25 percent were employed in the month after bankruptcy. This suggests that a substantial share
of workers were re-employed either by new owners of the bankruptcy firm or by a different firm, and
may gain eligibility for AFP despite being initially ineligible.
Figure 2: Employment around bankruptcy date
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Notes: The figures show the fraction of individuals employed by bankruptcy firm (left) and any firm (right) relative to the month of bankruptcy.
The sample consists of individuals employed by a firm with AFP affiliation 24 months before the firm’s bankruptcy date who satisfied the initial
AFP eligibility criteria (see details in Section 3.1). The sample includes bankruptcies between 2001–2010 and workers aged 59–61 years at
the firm’s bankruptcy date.
For perfect identification of exogenous loss (or gain) of access to AFP, we would ideally want to
observe exogenous shocks to eligibility directly. However, we can only observe the age related to the
day of the bankruptcy serving as an instrument for eligibility. While we are able to construct a measure
of eligibility based on the various criteria, we cannot observe actual eligibility for AFP directly. It is
also not clear how to define eligibility for AFP in our setting as workers who are initially ineligible may
regain eligibility at a later stage if they become re-employed in a covered firm. In our main empirical
approach, we therefore report reduced form estimates from the RD model outlined in Equations 3 and
4 which yields the intention-to-treat effect (ITT) of optional early retirement. These estimates can be
interpreted as the effect of being initially eligible for AFP based on employment status two years prior
to bankruptcy and can be considered as lower bound estimates of optional early retirement.
In an attempt to quantify the effect of optional early retirement, we use an alternative RD model
where we use age at bankruptcy as an instrument for our constructed eligibility measure in a fuzzy RD
approach. Under certain assumptions, this approach yields the local average treatment effect (LATE),
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that is the average effect of having the option to retire early for compliers in our sample.17 While we are
concerned about measurement errors in our treatment variable in particular, this approach is useful for
better understanding of the effects of having the option to retire early. We report results from our fuzzy
RD approach in Section 6.
5 Main results
We now turn to our main results. First, we present the direct effect on take-up of AFP benefits from
reaching the individual cut-off date before the bankruptcy occurs. We then turn to investigating the
effects on subsequent employment, and finally explore whether the loss of eligibility for early retirement
benefits induces benefit substitution toward other public transfer programs.
5.1 Direct effects on early retirement
Figure 3 illustrates two measures of the magnitude of the direct treatment effect: AFP claiming (panel
a), which is a dummy equal to 1 if individuals have claimed AFP benefits at some point between ages
62–67, and AFP benefits (panel b), which is the cumulative take-up of benefits between ages 62–67
(in $1,000). The left-hand side observations consist of individuals who lose their job before reaching
the eligibility cut-off, and thus lose their AFP benefit from that particular firm. However, they might
recover the lost benefit by extending their working career or by leaving the firm early and find a new
job. Those on the right-hand side are certain to fulfill the eligibility criteria if they are still employed by
the firm when the bankruptcy occurs. The closer to the cut-off, the shorter the time-period for which the
individual may claim AFP. Those who are just above the cut-off have to claim AFP in the month after
they turn 62 years which is the first month they can claim AFP, and the last month they are considered
as engaged in employment by the bankruptcy firm.
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  RD estimate: .423*** (.098)
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  RD estimate: 61.6*** (14.2)
Notes: The figures show the fraction of individuals with some AFP benefit take-up (a) and AFP benefit take-up in $1,000 (b) between 62–67
years of age, and the estimated regression lines of local linear regressions with rectangular kernel densities and 12 months of bandwidth on
each side of the cut-off. The dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The sample
consists of individuals employed by a firm with AFP affiliation 24 months before the firm’s bankruptcy date who satisfied the initial AFP
eligibility criteria (see details in Section 3.1). The sample includes bankruptcies between 2001–2010 and workers aged 59–61 years at the
firm’s bankruptcy date. AFP benefits are measured in 2015 dollars (NOK/USD = 9).
17In our setting, the compliers are the workers who become eligible for early retirement because their age is above the
eligibility cut-off.
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The figures show a visually clear discontinuity at the threshold for the two measures of the magnitude
of the direct treatment. Using our RD strategy, we estimate an increase in AFP claiming of about
42 percentage points among individuals who worked in firms that experienced a bankruptcy just after
reaching the individual threshold. Equally, we estimate that these individuals claim about $61,600 more
total AFP benefits. The estimates suggest that our treatment had a significant impact on the displaced
workers’ ability to retire early with an AFP benefit.
5.2 Effect on subsequent employment
We now ask whether initial AFP eligibility had an impact on re-employment rates and labor market
earnings. Theoretically, those who lose eligibility should be induced to extend their working career to
redeem some of the lost pension benefits at the expense of foregone leisure which becomes costlier. At
the same time, individuals may have a hard time finding a new job as they are relatively close to the
standard retirement age of 67 years. Local labor demand could also be an important factor.
Visually, Figure 4a shows that we are unable to detect a discontinuity around the cut-off in terms of
employment at the extensive margin between ages 62–67. Similarly, Figure 4b shows that we cannot
distinguish between labor market earnings for individuals on either side of the cut-off, with a negligible
point estimate of $5,600 which corresponds to about $1,100 in annual earnings. We observe a downward
slope in both figures, consistent with the fact that those who are further to the right are older workers at
the time of the bankruptcy and thus closer to the standard retirement age.
Figure 4: Graphical evidence of employment at the extensive margin and labor market earnings
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  RD estimate: -.02 (.126)
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  RD estimate: -5.6 (20.5)
Notes: The figures show the fraction of individuals ever engaging in employment (a) and the unrestricted means for each age-bin of labor
market earnings in $1,000 (b) between 62–67 years of age, and the estimated regression lines of local linear regressions with rectangular
kernel densities and 12 months of bandwidth on each side of the cut-off. The dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors
are clustered at the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. The sample consists of individuals employed by a firm with AFP affiliation
24 months before the firm’s bankruptcy date who satisfied the initial AFP eligibility criteria (see details in Section 3.1). The sample includes
bankruptcies between 2001–2010 and workers aged 59–61 years at the firm’s bankruptcy date.
We report regression results for the two outcomes in Table 2. The first column reports results of our
main specification without controls. In the second column, we report results where we include the pre-
determined covariates in Appendix Table A.1 as control variables and year fixed-effects. The inclusion of
control variables barely moves our estimates which is reassuring as the pre-determined covariates should
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have the same distribution on either side of the cut-off. We also report means and standard deviations
of the initially ineligible workers (i.e. the workers to the left of the cut-off) and of our comparison
sample of all private sector workers in columns 3 and 4, respectively. Our results indicate that workers
who lose eligibility for early retirement benefits because of job displacement are either unwilling to, or
possibly unable to redeem parts of the lost benefits through re-engaging in the labor market. While this
may be surprising from a theoretical point of view, a possible explanation could be that workers could
offset some of the lost benefits if they are eligible for other types of social security benefits such as
unemployment benefits before they reach the standard retirement age. We investigate this hypothesis in
the next section.




Outcome: RD estimate (ITT): ineligible sector workers
Ever employed -.020 -.018 .492 .808
(.126) (.136)
Labor market earnings ($1,000) -5.6 -4.1 59.5 122.0
(20.5) (20.3) [89.0] [142.4]
Controls NO YES
Number of firms 127 127 82 48,451
Number of individuals 223 223 120 141,122
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Notes: The table shows results of local linear RD regressions using a rectangular kernel and 12 months of bandwidth on each side of the
cut-off for each outcome. Controls in the alternative specification include the variables used for balancing tests (see Appendix Table A.1)
and year fixed-effects. The sample consists of individuals employed by a firm with AFP affiliation 24 months before the firm’s bankruptcy
date who satisfied the initial AFP eligibility criteria (see details in Section 3.1). The sample includes bankruptcies between 2001–2010 and
workers aged 59–61 years at the firm’s bankruptcy date. Initially ineligible are defined as the estimation sample to the left of the cut-off. The
comparison sample of all private sector workers includes individuals who were employed by a private sector firm when aged 57–59 years
(excluding bankruptcies). Earnings are measured in 2015 dollars (NOK/USD = 9).
One might argue that the employment effect can be affected by the timing of when the bankruptcy
occurs, perhaps due to anticipation in the pre-period and increasing job-searching effort in the post-
period. Therefore, we explore whether the RD effect is stable over time relative to the bankruptcy date.
This also serves partly as a robustness check of our main result. We compute separate RD point estimates
for each month m in the time span m ∈ (−24,60) for labor market earnings. The results are presented in
Figure 5.
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Notes: The figures show separate ITT estimates of labor market earnings (in $1,000) for each month relative to bankruptcy date. The ITT
effects are estimated by local linear RD regressions using a rectangular kernel and 12 months of bandwidth on each side of the cut-off. Point
estimates are represented by the black solid line, and the dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level. The sample consists of individuals employed by a firm with AFP affiliation 24 months before the firm’s bankruptcy date who
satisfied the initial AFP eligibility criteria (see details in Section 3.1). The sample includes bankruptcies between 2001–2010 and workers
aged 59–61 years at the firm’s bankruptcy date. Earnings are measured in 2015 dollars (NOK/USD = 9).
We observe that the ITT estimate on labor market earnings is very close to zero in our initial time
period 24 months before bankruptcy, and then increases somewhat during the months leading up to
bankruptcy. While the effect is not significant for either of these months, we observe a sharp and sizable
drop in the month after the bankruptcy for which the effect remains roughly stable around zero. This
might suggest that we are unable to find an effect on labor supply in the months after bankruptcy because
of noise in the months prior. We therefore repeat this exercise for the sample of workers who were
employed by the bankruptcy firm 12 months before and 1 month before bankruptcy as robustness checks,
shown in Appendix Figure A.3. As the figures show, we are still unable to find a significant labor market
earnings effect, with point estimates very stable around zero. This suggests that the additional “early
leavers” in our initial estimation sample do not affect our point estimates substantially, providing further
evidence of lack of labor supply responses.
5.3 Benefit substitution
As reported in the previous section, we were unable to find any effects of lost AFP eligibility on re-
employment rates. A possible explanation for this could be that workers were able to offset some of
the lost benefits through take-up of other social security benefits depending on eligibility. In particular,
Bratsberg et al. (2013) showed that a large share of DI claims in Norway could be attributed to job
displacements. We therefore start our analysis by investigating benefit substitution toward DI benefits.
As explained in Section 2, the DI benefit in our sample period was essentially equivalent to the AFP,
meaning that given the choice of AFP or DI, all else equal, workers should in principle be financially
indifferent between the two benefit programs.
Disability insurance (DI) Figure 6 shows the fraction of individuals who claim DI benefits at some
point between ages 62–67 (panel 6a) and the cumulative DI benefit take-up between ages 62–67 (panel
6b) around the cut-off. From panel 6a, we observe a clear discontinuity in the likelihood of claiming DI
17
benefits depending on initial AFP eligibility. Our reduced-form RD-estimate indicates that DI claiming
is about 36 percentage points lower among individuals who worked in firms where the bankruptcy oc-
curred just after they reached the individual age threshold. As about half of those who were just initially
ineligible for AFP claim DI benefits, the effect of reaching the threshold translates to a reduction in DI
claiming by about 75 percent. Panel 6b shows the corresponding effect on cumulative DI benefit take-up
(in $1,000). Workers who retain eligibility for AFP claim about $31,400 less DI benefits between ages
62–67, or about half of the DI benefits that individuals who do not retain eligibility receive.
Figure 6: Graphical evidence of benefit substitution towards DI between 62–67 years of age
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  RD estimate: -.357*** (.094)
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  RD estimate: -31.4** (13.3)
Notes: The figures show the fraction of individuals ever on DI (a) and the unrestricted means for each age-bin of cumulative DI take-up in
$1,000 (b) between 62–67 years of age, and the estimated regression lines of local linear regressions with rectangular kernel densities and 12
months of bandwidth on each side of the cut-off. The dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level. The sample consists of individuals employed by a firm with AFP affiliation 24 months before the firm’s bankruptcy date who satisfied
the initial AFP eligibility criteria (see details in Section 3.1). The sample includes bankruptcies between 2001–2010 and workers aged 59–61
years at the firm’s bankruptcy date. Benefits are measured in 2015 dollars (NOK/USD = 9).
The RD estimate for AFP benefits in panel 3b suggested that those who reached the individual
eligibility age before bankruptcy date increased their take-up of AFP benefits by about $61,600. Our
results thus indicate that about half the lost benefits are replaced by DI benefits. The estimates are highly
significant, and we interpret this as clear evidence of program substitution toward DI benefits.
Unemployment insurance (UI) and other public transfers We now investigate whether individuals
who were initially ineligible offset some of the lost AFP benefits through take-up of unemployment
insurance. Additionally, we pool all public transfers (excluding AFP and old-age pensions) in order to
estimate benefit substitution toward all relevant parts of the social security system. Figure 7 shows the
cumulative take-up of UI benefits (panel 7a) and total public transfers (panel 7b) between ages 62–67
years (in $1,000). Although we estimate that individuals who were just initially eligible claimed less UI
benefits, this effect is not significant at conventional levels. However, workers in our sample are only
eligible for UI benefits for up to 2 years. As most individuals close to the cut-off are just a few months
shy of turning 61 years when bankruptcy occurs, most individuals would have exhausted their UI spell
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before turning 62 years.18 Panel 7b shows that initially ineligible individuals claimed significantly more
non-pension public transfers. Our point estimate indicates that they claim about $42,500 more between
ages 62–67, where we estimated that $31,400 is DI benefits and $7,700 is UI benefits. This suggests that
a negligible $3,400 is replaced by other social security benefits.
Figure 7: Graphical evidence of unemployment insurance and total social insurance benefit take-up
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  RD estimate: -7.7 (7.1)












-18 -12 -6 0 6 12 18
AFP eligibility cut-off age (months)
 
 
  RD estimate: -42.5*** (15)
Notes: The figures show unrestricted means for each age-bin of cumulative UI take-up and total social insurance benefit take-up in $1,000
between 62–67 years of age, and the estimated regression lines of local linear regressions with rectangular kernel densities and 12 months of
bandwidth on each side of the cut-off. The dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The
sample consists of individuals employed by a firm with AFP affiliation 24 months before the firm’s bankruptcy date who satisfied the initial
AFP eligibility criteria (see details in Section 3.1). The sample includes bankruptcies between 2001–2010 and workers aged 59–61 years at
the firm’s bankruptcy date. Benefits are measured in 2015 dollars (NOK/USD = 9).
Table 3 reports point estimates of AFP benefits and program substitution toward social insurance
benefits. While total program substitution effects are slightly lower if we include control variables, es-
timates are qualitatively similar. Our estimates indicate that individuals who were just initially eligible
for AFP claim about half of non-pension social security benefits compared to those who were initially
ineligible. While AFP benefit take-up is $61,600 higher among workers who retain eligibility, about
$42,500 are replaced with other social security benefits among those who are initially ineligible, equiv-
alent to a replacement rate of about 69 percent. Of those, about 51 percent is DI benefits and 13 percent
is UI benefits. We interpret this as substantial benefit substitution, as those who are initially ineligible
due to the job displacement substantially increase take-up of other social transfers.
18We consider program complementarity between AFP and UI highly unlikely between ages 62–67 years as eligible indi-
viduals can claim AFP from age 62.
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Table 3: Effect of initial AFP eligibility on cumulative social insurance benefit take-up ($1,000)
between 62–67 years of age
Mean [SD]
Initially All private
Outcome: RD estimate (ITT): ineligible sector workers
AFP benefits 61.6*** 57.6*** 11.4 35.3
(14.2) (15.7) [35.0] [59.4]
Program substitution:
Total public transfers -42.5*** -36.2** 88.8 69.0
(15.0) (16.1) [74.5] [98.7]
• DI benefits -31.4** -24.6* 59.5 25.1
(13.3) (14.5) [72.1] [53.6]
• Unemployment benefits -7.7 -9.5 13.2 2.7
(7.1) (7.2) [24.9] [13.8]
Controls NO YES
Number of firms 127 127 82 48,451
Number of individuals 223 223 120 141,122
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Notes: The table shows results of local linear RD regressions using a rectangular kernel and 12 months of bandwidth on each side of the
cut-off for each outcome. Controls in the alternative specification include the variables used for balancing tests (see Appendix Table A.1) and
year fixed-effects. The sample consists of individuals employed by a firm with AFP affiliation 24 months before the firm’s bankruptcy date
who satisfied the initial AFP eligibility criteria (Section 3.1). The sample includes bankruptcies between 2001–2010 and workers aged 59–61
years at the firm’s bankruptcy date. Initially ineligible are defined as the estimation sample to the left of the cut-off. The comparison sample of
all private sector workers includes individuals who were employed by a private sector firm when aged 57–59 years (excluding bankruptcies).
Benefits are measured in 2015 dollars (NOK/USD = 9).
Effect for each age group To further investigate how those who become displaced just before the age
cut-off redeem their lost benefits in terms of increased take-up of other public transfers, we run separate
RD regressions for each age group. The point estimates are reported in Appendix Table A.2. Figure 8
illustrates the effects graphically. In panel 8a, the darkest area, spanning from zero, is the ITT estimate
on AFP benefit take-up for each age, e.g. just reaching the individual threshold implies an increased
take-up of AFP benefits by just over $15,000 at age 63. The three lighter stacked areas show how those
who are initially ineligible redeem the lost benefits at each age, mainly due to lower AFP take-up among
the oldest individuals while take-up of other social benefits is fairly stable across the age groups. We
observe that take-up of DI benefits is by far the largest substitute, and that the degree of substitution is
increasing in age. This is further illustrated in panel 8b, showing the effects on take-up of DI benefits,
UI benefits and other public transfers relative to the effect on take-up of AFP benefits for each age. We
observe that the increased replacement rate mainly is driven by increased replacement through take-up
of DI benefits.
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Figure 8: Graphical illustration of program substitution

















































Notes: Panel (a) illustrates the ITT effect for each outcome and each age (in $1,000). The total area is the ITT effect of AFP benefits, while
the other shaded areas illustrate the ITT effect of each social insurance benefit. Panel (b) illustrates the same effects, but relative to of the
ITT effect of AFP benefit take-up. The ITT effects are estimated by local linear RD regressions using a rectangular kernel and 12 months
of bandwidth on each side of the cut-off. The sample consists of individuals employed by a firm with AFP affiliation 24 months before the
firm’s bankruptcy date who satisfied the initial AFP eligibility criteria (see details in Section 3.1). The sample includes bankruptcies between
2001–2010 and workers aged 59–61 years at the firm’s bankruptcy date. Benefits are measured in 2015 dollars (NOK/USD = 9).
5.4 Robustness analysis
To verify the validity of our main results, we conduct a series of robustness checks. In Table 4 we
present eight alternative specifications in addition to our main specification which uses a rectangular
kernel and 12 months of bandwidth on each side of the cut-off. We observe that in all our robustness
checks, estimates remain fairly close to our baseline specification. Take-up of AFP benefits are positive
and significant for all specifications, with the point estimates being quite stable across specifications. For
total public transfers (excluding pensions) and DI benefit take-up, we observe that the point estimates are
negative for all our specifications and are close in magnitude. For total public transfers, all specifications
are significant at the 10% level.
The first specification in Table 4 is our baseline RD estimates of the cumulative outcomes between
ages 62–67. The second row adds control variables which include the pre-determined variables we use
for balancing (see Appendix Table A.1) and year fixed-effects, which we observe has little impact on
our main cumulative outcomes. Next, we use separate quadratic trends on each side of the discontinuity
instead of separate linear trends. We observe that estimates are less precisely estimated and a magnitude
larger. In specifications (iv) and (v) we check whether a local linear specification is appropriate when we
deviate from the baseline choice of bandwidth. Particularly, we report estimates reducing the bandwidth
by 50 percent (from 12 to 6 months) and increasing the bandwidth by 50 percent (18 months). We
observe that the point estimates are very similar to the baseline specification. In Appendix Figure A.2 we
extend this exercise by plotting the RD estimates with confidence intervals for each outcome. Combining
the evidence from specifications (iv) and (v) with the graphical evidence in Appendix Figure A.2, we
conclude that the estimates are very stable to the choice of bandwidth when we use linear trends. This
suggests that linearity is a reasonable approximation to the trends around the cut-off. In specification (vi)
we use a triangular kernel (rather than rectangular kernel) which has negligible impact on our estimates.
Specifications (vii) and (viii) change the pre-determination of employment status in bankruptcy firms
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from 24 months before bankruptcy to 12 months before and 1 month before, respectively. Reassuringly,
the point estimates are quite similar to our main specification although estimates in the latter specification
are less precise due to the smaller sample size. Finally, specification (ix) includes bankruptcies where at
least 1/3 of (all) employees switched to the same firm which we deemed as “spurious” bankruptcies. As
expected, the estimated effects are smaller in magnitude when we include these firms as a larger share
of workers did not experience a job displacement but were rather collectively moved to a new firm.
Table 4: Specification checks
Program substitution:
AFP Labor market Total public DI Unemployment Obs
benefits earnings transfers benefits benefits <Firms>
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
i: Baseline RD estimate 61.6*** -5.6 -42.5*** -31.4** -7.7 223
(14.2) (20.5) (15.0) (13.3) (7.1) <127>
ii: With controls 57.6*** -4.1 -36.2** -24.6* -9.5 223
(15.7) (20.3) (16.1) (14.5) (7.2) <127>
iii: Quadratic trends 73.5*** 30.2 -67.0*** -40.4** -12.6 223
(19.2) (34.8) (23.0) (20.2) (11.8) <127>
iv: Bandwidth: 75.9*** 19.3 -43.6** -26.9 -9.9 115
50% lower (20.3) (33.2) (22.2) (18.6) (11.0) <70>
v: Bandwidth: 64.4*** -8.8 -42.5*** -32.3*** -9.0 305
50% higher (12.6) (17.5) (13.7) (12.3) (5.9) <160>
vi: Triangular kernel 66.3*** 8.4 -52.0*** -35.0** -9.6 223
(14.4) (24.5) (16.4) (13.8) (8.6) <127>
vii: Workers 12 months 60.6*** .4 -44.9*** -34.0** -5.7 213
pre-bankruptcy (14.9) (21.7) (17.0) (15.1) (7.1) <124>
viii: Workers 1 month 62.9*** .4 -37.0* -27.9 -5.6 163
pre-bankruptcy (16.2) (27.5) (20.0) (17.5) (8.9) <96>
ix: With “spurious” 49.0*** -2.3 -26.5* -18.4 -3.0 290
bankruptcies (13.2) (22.5) (14.5) (12.2) (6.6) <161>
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Notes: The table shows results of local RD regressions for each outcome (in $1,000) and each respective specification. All specifications use
linear separate linear trends except specification (iii) which uses separate quadratic trends. Main specification (i) uses a rectangular kernel and
12 months of bandwidth. Controls in specification (ii) include the variables used for balancing tests (see Appendix Table A.1) and year fixed-
effects. Specification (vii) and (viii) includes workers who worked in bankruptcy firm 12 and 1 month respectively before the bankruptcy date
(all other specifications include individuals who worked in firm 24 months before bankruptcy). Specification (ix) also includes bankruptcies
where at least 1/3 of (all) employees switched to the same firm. The sample consists of individuals employed by a firm with AFP affiliation
24, 12 or 1 month(s) (depending on specification) before the firm’s bankruptcy date who satisfied the initial AFP eligibility criteria (see details
in Section 3.1). The sample includes bankruptcies between 2001–2010 and workers aged 59–61 years at the firm’s bankruptcy date. Earnings
and benefits are measured in 2015 dollars (NOK/USD = 9).
We also perform a placebo test by using private sector bankruptcy firms without AFP coverage in
an otherwise similar setup to our baseline sample. As the “cut-off” for these workers does not involve
the loss (or gain) of early retirement eligibility, our main outcomes should have the same distribution
just before and just after the hypothetical cut-off. The estimated effects of our cumulative outcomes
are relegated to Appendix Table A.3 and shown graphically in Appendix Figure A.5. We are unable to
22
reject the null of no difference between workers on each side of the cut-off for any of our main outcomes.
There is, as expected, a close-to-zero effect on AFP benefit take-up, as the only way for these individuals
to become eligible for AFP benefits is to switch workplace to a firm with AFP coverage and acquire at
least three years of tenure. While the point estimate for labor market earnings is positive, and the point
estimates for public transfers and DI benefits are negative, the estimates are roughly within one standard
error.
5.5 Heterogeneity
As workers in our estimation sample differ somewhat in characteristics compared to the average private
sector worker, we further investigate the driving forces behind the main responses. Particularly, Table
1 revealed that workers in our sample are typically male workers in the manufacturing sector. To un-
derstand to which extent our results have external validity, we therefore explore heterogeneous effects.
Workers’ wages and education may also be important; workers with high wages are likely eligible for
a higher AFP benefit as the benefit is linked to past earnings, which may result in loss of eligibility for
AFP being a larger shock to individuals with higher wages. However, workers with high wages may also
have better outside options in the labor market than workers with low wages, and may have lower search
costs when unemployed.19 We therefore expect that workers with higher pre-bankruptcy earnings have
higher re-employment rates, and possibly lower program substitution rates.
To determine how the pattern of labor market adaptation and take-up of social benefits differ across
worker groups, we use the same initial estimation sample and empirical strategy on subsets of workers.
In Table 5 we report estimates of our main cumulative outcomes between ages 62–67 corresponding to
differences in gender, pre-bankruptcy earnings, educational attainment and industry.20
The estimated coefficients for men indicate that they exhibit similar properties as the full estimation
sample. For women, the point estimates are smaller, but also more imprecise mainly due to the small
sample size. While we lack precision to provide a definitive answer to whether there are differences
between genders, the estimates suggest that men are more likely to respond to the incentive to claim
AFP benefits and reduce take-up of other social benefits, while women to a larger extent claim other
social security benefits regardless of having the option to retire early.21
To explore heterogeneous effects in pre-bankruptcy earnings, we split our sample on earnings (24
months) prior to bankruptcy. As expected, compared to high earnings workers, the effect on AFP benefit
take-up is smaller for workers with low earnings (smaller than or equal to the median). This difference is
likely somewhat mechanical as low earnings workers have lower accrual of AFP on average. However,
we observe that low earnings workers replace almost the entire loss of AFP benefits with other social
security benefits, while high earnings workers replace a significantly lower share. In fact, the estimated
coefficients for high earnings workers on our social security outcomes are not significantly different
from zero at conventional levels. While this suggest that high earnings workers may have better outside
options and respond to the labor supply incentives, we observe that the estimated coefficients on labor
market earnings, although imprecise, are practically indistinguishable between the two groups.
19Similarly, education may be correlated with better outside options, as education is highly correlated with earnings.
20For the latter subgroup, we explore manufacturing specifically, as this is the by far largest subgroup of workers within the
private sector AFP workers.
21When exploring gender differences, we would ideally also want to explore spousal spillover effects. We estimated the
effect on spousal outcomes and found no effects on employment or take-up of any social security benefits for the spouse. We
emphasize that this should be interpreted with caution due to our small sample size, although the point estimates are close to
zero.
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Table 5: Subsample analysis of labor market earnings and social insurance benefit take-up ($1,000)
between 62–67 years of age
Program substitution:
AFP Labor market Total public DI Unemployment Obs
benefits earnings transfers benefits benefits <Firms>
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full sample 61.6*** -5.6 -42.5*** -31.4** -7.7 223
(14.2) (20.5) (15.0) (13.3) (7.1) <127>
[11.4] [59.6] [88.8] [59.5] [13.2]
Males 70.7*** -8.2 -44.9*** -39.1** -3.1 173
(14.8) (24.8) (17.4) (16.2) (5.7) <101>
[11.2] [66.6] [89.9] [62.7] [11.2]
Females 29.8 -12.5 -30.0 -7.9 -17.4 50
(37.7) (29.3) (32.8) (25.3) (20.5) <42>
[12.1] [36.4] [85.1] [49.2] [19.5]
High earnings 75.0*** -3.5 -32.7 -28.9 -6.5 108
(23.9) (34.0) (24.8) (21.2) (10.0) <65>
[13.8] [74.2] [91.4] [57.1] [14.4]
Low earnings 51.1*** -4.9 -50.5** -32.7* -9.2 115
(18.3) (22.6) (19.9) (18.3) (9.2) <87>
[9.2] [45.8] [86.3] [61.8] [12.1]
High education 21.9 -7.5 -5.2 -5.1 -2.1 75
(27.7) (41.4) (34.8) (27.8) (6.1) <50>
[18.7] [89.7] [68.9] [42.6] [7.9]
Low education 81.8*** .8 -63.3*** -46.3*** -11.5 148
(16.5) (21.1) (17.3) (16.1) (9.3) <99>
[7.4] [42.7] [99.9] [69.0] [16.1]
Manufacturing 47.8*** 18.7 -46.9** -49.4*** 4.1 149
(16.6) (22.5) (19.3) (17.1) (6.9) <72>
[14.3] [58.5] [93.7] [63.9] [11.9]
Other industries 96.6*** -53.1 -42.8* -6.6 -29.7** 74
(25.7) (37.9) (24.7) (19.0) (12.0) <55>
[6.4] [61.4] [80.0] [51.6] [15.5]
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. Independent means of initially ineligible
(the sample to the left of cut-off) in brackets.
Notes: The table shows results of local linear RD regressions using a rectangular kernel and 12 months of bandwidth on each side of the cut-off
for each outcome (in $1,000) and each subgroup. High earnings are defined as larger than median 24 months before bankruptcy date, and
low earnings otherwise. High education is defined as completed high school or more, and low education otherwise. The sample consists of
individuals employed by a firm with AFP affiliation 24 months before the firm’s bankruptcy date who satisfied the initial AFP eligibility criteria
(see details in Section 3.1). The sample includes bankruptcies between 2001–2010 and workers aged 59–61 years at the firm’s bankruptcy
date. Earnings and benefits are measured in 2015 dollars (NOK/USD = 9).
When we split our sample on educational attainment (high education is defined as completed high
school and low education otherwise), we find a quite similar pattern as when we split our sample on
earnings prior to bankruptcy, although with one notable exception; the point estimate on AFP benefits is
large and highly significant for workers with low education, but rather low and insignificant for workers
with high education. The point estimates on our social security outcomes are significantly larger for
low-education workers and gives relatively clear evidence of responses being driven by low education
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workers.
In our estimation sample, around 68 percent of workers are employed in the manufacturing industry
compared to 30 percent of all private sector firms. To investigate the external validity of our findings,
we therefore do separate estimations for workers in the manufacturing industry and workers who were
employed in other industries. We observe that point estimates on AFP benefits are smaller for workers in
the manufacturing industry. However, this is not because of differences in wages; in fact, workers in the
manufacturing have comparable earnings to workers in other industries prior to bankruptcy. While the
point estimates of total public transfers are similar between the two subgroups, manufacturing workers
replace a much larger share of the lost AFP benefits with other social security benefits compared to
other workers. In fact, the point estimates suggest that manufacturing workers replace the entire lost
AFP benefits with DI benefits, suggesting that workers in more physically demanding jobs are more
inclined to be eligible and possibly apply for DI benefits. There is no evidence for such replacement
for workers in other industries. In fact, there is clear evidence of workers in other industries replacing
some of the lost AFP benefits with unemployment benefits, with a coefficient significant at the 5% level.
Interestingly, the point estimate of labor market earnings is negative and relatively large for workers in
non-manufacturing industries compared to manufacturing workers. While not significant at conventional
levels, it may seem that the lack of a labor supply response for our main estimation sample could be
driven by manufacturing workers. A possible explanation for this could be because of low local labor
demand, and in particular for workers with specific occupational skills, as a relatively large share of the
manufacturing firms in our sample were relatively large firms located in small towns.
6 Instrumental variable estimates
While our main findings show that being initially eligible for AFP based on employment status 24
months prior to bankruptcy affects AFP claiming and take-up of social security benefits, these findings
may underestimate the true effects of being eligible for AFP as some initially eligible individuals may
leave the firm early and not satisfy the eligibility criteria, and some individuals who were initially in-
eligible may regain eligibility if re-employed in a different firm covered by the AFP scheme. In this
section, we therefore use the individual eligibility age as an instrument for AFP eligibility in an instru-
mental variables (IV) setup in an attempt to estimate the true effect of optional early retirement. This
approach yields the local average treatment effect (LATE), that is the average effect of having the option
to retire early for compliers in our sample (Imbens & Angrist, 1994). In our setting, the compliers are
workers who become eligible for early retirement because their age is above the eligibility cut-off but
would not have become eligible otherwise. In our alternative fuzzy RD design, the empirical model can
be summarized by the following two equations:
Ei = α0 +α1Zai≥0 + f (ai)+δXit + εit (6)
yit = β0 +β1Ei + f (ai)+δXit + εit (7)
where Ei takes the value one if individual i is eligible for AFP and zero otherwise, Xit is a set of covariates
and yit is the outcome of interest for individual i at time t, εit is the error term and f is an unknown





0 if ai < 0
1 if ai ≥ 0
(8)
where ai is defined as in Equation (1), meaning that if individuals’ age at the bankruptcy date is above the
threshold, the instrument takes the value one, and zero otherwise. It is crucial that Z is uncorrelated with
potential measurement error in E. While we are able to construct a fairly accurate measure for eligibility
by determining who is eligible based on the criteria outlined in Section 2.1, we cannot observe eligibility
directly. Because of this, it is possible that our treatment variable is measured with some errors.22 While
measurement error in the treatment variable in an IV setting creates a bias in the estimator (see e.g.
Lewbel, 2007; Jiang & Ding, 2020; Yanagi, 2019), Ura (2018) and Yanagi (2019) showed that under the
assumption that the instrumental variable is uncorrelated with the measurement error in the treatment
variable (i.e. the probability of misclassification of treatment), the Wald estimator gives an upper bound
estimate in absolute value of the true coefficient.
Additionally, it is not clear how to define the treatment in our setting as individuals’ eligibility
status could change depending on employment status and the various other criteria for AFP. Therefore,
some non-treated or treated individuals could be partially treated. We decide to define our treatment
as eligible for AFP at some point between ages 62–67 years as most partially treated individuals will
regain eligibility shortly after the earliest point of withdrawal (e.g. at ages 62 or 63). In practice, this
means that our estimates will serve as upper bound estimates as some individuals we define as treated
will be partially treated. As potential measurement errors in our treatment variable will also contribute to
overestimate the true effects, we therefore emphasize that the IV estimates should be interpreted as upper
bound estimates of the effect of access to early retirement. However, we argue that the IV estimates are
useful for scaling of our main findings and interpretation of the true effect of AFP eligibility on our
outcomes.
A key identifying assumption for the IV to be valid is the exclusion restriction, i.e. the instrument
must be conditionally independent of potential outcomes. We argue that the exclusion restriction holds
in our case as just reaching a certain age in itself does not affect employment or take-up of other so-
cial security benefits, but only because age affects eligibility. As a further argument for this claim, our
placebo estimates of non-AFP workers reported in Appendix Table A.3 indicate that outcomes of inel-
igible individuals are indeed similar around the age-threshold. Another key identifying assumption is
monotonicity in responses. We consider “defiers” highly unlikely in our setting as this would imply that
some individuals become eligible because age is just below the threshold but would not have become el-
igible otherwise. Finally, the instrument must be relevant, i.e. just reaching the individual age-threshold
must affect eligibility. We verify this when summarizing our results.
The results of our fuzzy RD model are presented in Table 6. For comparison with our main estimates,
we also include the ITT estimates from the reduced form RD model. We emphasize that our instrument
has a high predictive power of the treatment variable. Our first-stage estimate shows that the probability
of being eligible for AFP is among 70 percentage points higher among those who just reached the
22Out of the 199 individuals we classified as ineligible following the standard criteria, 4 individuals in our sample or around
2 percent were observed with actual take-up of AFP. Unfortunately, we are unable to provide a measure of the number of
individuals we classify as eligible whose true status are in fact ineligible as we cannot distinguish these individuals from
never-takers of AFP.
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individual cut-off age at the firm bankruptcy date. We estimate that compliers increase AFP take-up
with $87,900 and decreases take-up of other social benefits by $60,600, where $44,800 of this is due to
decreased take-up of DI when becoming eligible for AFP.
Table 6: IV estimates of cumulative outcomes ($1,000)
Treatment variable: First stage:
Eligible for AFP .70*** .67***
(.08) (.09) Mean [SD]
Initially All private
Outcome: IV estimate (2SLS): Reduced form (ITT): ineligible sector workers
AFP benefits 87.9*** 85.5*** 61.6*** 57.6*** 11.4 35.3
(19.5) (21.0) (14.2) (15.7) [35.0] [59.4]
Labor market earnings -8.0 -6.1 -5.6 -4.1 59.5 122.0
(29.0) (28.4) (20.5) (20.3) [89.0] [142.4]
Total public transfers -60.6*** -53.7** -42.5*** -36.2** 88.8 69.0
(21.2) (21.6) (15.0) (16.1) [74.5] [98.7]
• DI benefits -44.8** -36.5* -31.4** -24.6* 59.5 25.1
(19.5) (20.4) (13.3) (14.5) [72.1] [53.6]
• Unemployment benefits -10.9 -14.0 -7.7 -9.5 13.2 2.7
(9.7) (9.4) (7.1) (7.2) [24.9] [13.8]
Controls NO YES NO YES
Number of firms 127 127 127 127 82 48,451
Number of individuals 223 223 223 223 120 141,122
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Notes: The table shows the 2SLS estimates of fuzzy RD regressions using AFP eligibility as the treatment variable, and the corresponding
reduced form estimates. Both specifications use local linear regressions using a rectangular kernel and 12 months of bandwidth on each
side of the cut-off for each outcome (in $1,000). Controls in the alternative specifications include the variables used for balancing tests (see
Appendix Table A.1) and year fixed-effects. The sample consists of individuals employed by a firm with AFP affiliation 24 months before the
firm’s bankruptcy date who satisfied the initial AFP eligibility criteria (see details in Section 3.1). The sample includes bankruptcies between
2001–2010 and workers aged 59–61 years at the firm’s bankruptcy date. Earnings and benefits are measured in 2015 dollars (NOK/USD = 9).
7 Implications
In this section, we assess the implications of our findings for policy and welfare for the displaced workers
in our sample. While access to an early retirement program provides better insurance for displaced
workers, it could also increase public expenditures through increased benefit payments and decreased
tax revenues. However, as we have shown, decreased benefit payments of other social security benefits
could offset some of the increased costs. These trade-offs are particularly important in assessing the
desirability of the program.
To assess how access to early retirement affects public finances, we estimate our RD model on net
public expenditures as the outcome variable, defined as net benefit payments from (all) social security
benefits net of payroll taxes from earnings (including income from self-employment). As a rough mea-
sure of how access to early retirement affects workers’ welfare, we consider disposable income as an
outcome variable, defined as total income from social security and earnings net of taxes. Finally, we
investigate savings as our third outcome variable defined as the annual change in wealth. To ease in-
terpretation, we do estimations on an annual basis when individuals are between 62 and 67 years of
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age.23
In Table 7, we report IV estimates from our fuzzy RD model as well as ITT estimates from our main
reduced form model. As we report estimates at the annual level, we consider individuals’ eligibility
status for AFP also at the annual level, and cluster standard errors at the individual and firm level. Our
estimates indicate that access to the AFP program had only a small impact on public finances. This is not
surprising given our previous findings, where we did not find evidence of an effect on labor supply, but
relatively large substitution effects onto other social security programs. At the 95% confidence level, our
IV estimate suggests that the annual increase in public expenditures is at most $16,400 for compliers in
our sample. Our estimates also indicate that access to the AFP program had little impact on the average
welfare for individuals. Due to lack of significance, we cannot conclude that access to early retirement
increased average disposable income for individuals. However, we can rule out a large decrease in the
average welfare for ineligible individuals. At the 95% confidence level, our IV estimate suggest that
the annual effect on disposable income is at most $10,300 for compliers in our sample. We are also
unable to conclude that access to early retirement had an effect on savings. Note that average savings
are positive among initially ineligible. Taken together, this suggests that most ineligible individuals had
some source of income.
Table 7: Annual financial costs and benefits ($1,000)
Treatment variable: First stage:
Eligible for AFP .78*** .74***
(.08) (.09) Mean [SD]
Initially All private
Outcome: IV estimate (2SLS): Reduced form (ITT): ineligible sector workers
Net public 7.2 7.1 5.6 5.3 14.8 10.1
expenditures (4.7) (4.8) (3.6) (3.6) [18.9] [30.7]
Disposable income 3.8 4.2 2.9 3.1 31.7 40.5
(3.3) (2.6) (2.6) (1.9) [11.6] [23.4]
Savings 1.6 1.7 1.2 1.3 .9 3.2
(3.1) (3.1) (2.5) (2.3) [33.5] [43.0]
Controls NO YES NO YES
Number of firms 124 124 124 124 79 48,644
Number of individuals 216 216 216 216 116 138,644
Number of observations 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 667 798,228
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the individual and firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Notes: The table shows the 2SLS estimates of fuzzy RD regressions using AFP eligibility as the treatment variable, and the corresponding
reduced form estimates. Both specifications use local linear regressions using a rectangular kernel and 12 months of bandwidth on each side of
the cut-off for each outcome (in $1,000). Controls in the alternative specifications include the variables used for balancing tests (see Appendix
Table A.1) and year fixed-effects. Net public expenditures are defined as net benefit payments from all social security programs subtracting
payroll taxes from earnings. Disposable income is defined as benefit payments and earnings net of taxes. Savings are defined as the change
in annual wealth. The sample consists of individuals employed by a firm with AFP affiliation 24 months before the firm’s bankruptcy date
who satisfied the initial AFP eligibility criteria (see details in Section 3.1). The sample includes bankruptcies between 2001–2010 and workers
aged 59–61 years at the firm’s bankruptcy date. Variables are measured in 2015 dollars (NOK/USD = 9).
23To compare these estimates to our main cumulative outcomes, these estimates should therefore be multiplied by 6, as years
between ages 62–67 include 6 calendar years.
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To further investigate this claim, we follow the standard framework of Imbens & Rubin (1997) and
estimate marginal distributions of disposable income under different treatment statuses for compliers. If
a larger share of individuals are significantly worse off, this might be of particular interest for policy-
makers. More specifically, we use eligibility age above cut-off (Z) as an instrument for AFP eligibility
(E) in a standard Imbens & Rubin (1997) framework. The marginal distributions of potential outcomes
for compliers ge where e is treatment status are defined as:
g0(y) = f00(y) · (pc + pc)/pc − f10(y) · pn/pc (9)
g1(y) = f11(y) · (pc + pc)/pc − f01(y) · pa/pc (10)
where fze is the distribution of disposable income for individuals with z being equal to 1 if eligibility age
is above cut-off and 0 otherwise and treatment status e = 0,1. pa is the proportion of “always-takers”,
pn is the proportion of “never-takers” and pc is the proportion of compliers. We estimate f using an
epanechnikov kernel with optimal bandwidth.
Figure 9 shows the estimated distributions of potential disposable income for compliers in our sam-
ple, that is, the individuals who become eligible for AFP because their age is above the eligibility cut-off
but would not have become eligible otherwise. Evidently, the disposable income of eligible compliers is
more concentrated around the mean with a rather small dispersion. In contrast, the dispersion is higher
among ineligible compliers, with a slight tendency of a fatter right-tail, meaning that a larger proportion
have higher disposable income. Even though there is evidence of a slightly larger proportion of ineligi-
ble compliers having low disposable income, the difference in the lower part of the distribution is almost
indistinguishable. This suggests that a very low share of ineligible individuals are significantly worse off
because of failing to qualify for early retirement, with most individuals getting some source of income
either through participation in the labor market or receiving some type of social security benefit.












Notes: The figure shows distributions of potential disposable income for compliers as defined by Imbens & Rubin (1997) (see text for details).
Densities are estimated using an epanechnikov kernel with optimal bandwidth of 1.74. The sample consists of individuals employed by a firm
with AFP affiliation 24 months before the firm’s bankruptcy date who satisfied the initial AFP eligibility criteria (see details in Section 3.1).
The sample includes bankruptcies between 2001–2010 and workers aged 59–61 years at the firm’s bankruptcy date. Disposable income is
defined as earnings and benefits excluding taxes and is measured in 2015 dollars (NOK/USD = 9).
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8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have asked how the loss of eligibility for early retirement benefits among displaced
workers affects re-employment rates and spillover onto other social security programs. We have used
detailed register data with information on exact dates of firm bankruptcies which allowed us to causally
estimate effects of individual eligibility for early retirement provision.
Using a regression discontinuity research design which compares workers where some end up
“reaching the threshold” for eligibility before a firm bankruptcy while some do not, we have been
unable to find that early retirement provision induces unintended adverse effects on re-employment.
Furthermore, our findings suggest that the loss of early retirement eligibility induces substantial excess
take-up of DI benefits among displaced workers. Tight eligibility criteria therefore may induce workers
to excessively apply for other social security benefits.
We emphasize that our findings are mainly driven by male, low educated workers in the manufactur-
ing sector. While we do not find significant effects for female workers or high educated workers, we find
an offsetting effect on UI benefit take-up among workers in non-manufacturing industries, but no effect
on DI for these workers. Moreover, we take several steps to ensure the validity of our findings and show
that our main conclusions do not change depending on specifications of the RD design. Reassuringly,
our results are not sensitive to the choice of when to pre-determine employment in the firm or the choice
of bandwidth.
While access to an early retirement program provides better insurance for displaced workers, it
could also increase public expenditures through increased benefit payments and decreased tax revenues.
We showed that the early retirement program did not significantly increase public expenditures, as in-
eligible workers did not increase their labor supply but rather claimed other social security benefits.
Therefore, we conclude that provision of early retirement for displaced elderly workers is desirable for
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Appendix A Additional Tables and Figures
Table A.1: Smoothness of predetermined covariates
Main est. sample: Placebo sample:
AFP workers Non-AFP workers
Dependent variable: coeff. std. error p-value coeff. std. error p-value
Female -.093 (.109) .395 .050 (.087) .568
Married .015 (.113) .893 -.068 (.090) .448
Years of education -.236 (.435) .588 .324 (.475) .496
Tenure -.85 (2.45) .728 .58 (1.45) .688
Number of employees 17 (36) .640 -1.51 (2.89) .600
Monthly earnings ($1,000) -.155 (.530) .771 .387 (.406) .341
Manufacturing .073 (.123) .554 -.177** (.084) .036
Full time employment .077 (.064) .228 -.121** (.053) .023
Local DI rate .014** (.007) .037 .005 (.005) .307
Local unemp. rate -.001 (.002) .687 .000 (.002) .871
Share senior workers .026 (.029) .383 .028 (.042) .505
Wealth ($1,000) -27 (24) .263 .2 (20.1) .993
Sickness benefits -.043 (.096) .655 .002 (.065) .975
Joint test .402 .228
Number of individuals (firms) 223 (127) 417 (372)
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Notes: The table shows results of local linear RD regressions using a rectangular kernel and 12 months of bandwidth on each side of the
cut-off for each pre-determined covariate. Each covariate is measured 24 months before bankruptcy date for each employee. Local DI rate
and unemployment rates are measured at the municipality level. The share of senior workers is defined as the share of (all) coworkers above
57 years (excluding self). The main estimation sample consists of individuals employed by a firm with AFP affiliation 24 months before the
firm’s bankruptcy date who satisfied the initial AFP eligibility criteria (see details in Section 3.1). The placebo sample consists of individuals
employed by a firm without AFP affiliation 24 months before the firm’s bankruptcy date, but otherwise satisfied the initial AFP eligibility
criteria. Both samples include bankruptcies between 2001–2010 and workers aged 59–61 years at the firm’s bankruptcy date. Earnings and
wealth are measured in 2015 dollars (NOK/USD = 9).
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Table A.2: Effect of initial AFP eligibility on labor market earnings and social insurance benefit
take-up ($1,000) by age
Program substitution:
AFP Labor market Total public DI Unemployment Obs
benefits earnings transfers benefits benefits <Firms>
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total effect 61.6*** -5.6 -42.5*** -31.4** -7.7 223
62-67 years (14.2) (20.5) (15.0) (13.3) (7.1) <127>
Effect by age:
62 years 7.2*** -2.7 -1.8 -3.7 1.5 216
(2.0) (8.3) (3.7) (2.9) (3.2) <124>
63 years 15.9*** -1.2 -8.4** -4.1 -4.2** 214
(3.2) (7.7) (3.5) (3.1) (1.9) <124>
64 years 14.3*** -1.9 -10.8*** -7.0** -1.7 212
(3.3) (5.3) (3.3) (3.0) (1.5) <123>
65 years 13.3*** 1.0 -10.6*** -7.9*** -1.5 211
(3.0) (4.3) (3.3) (3.0) (1.2) <123>
66 years 12.4*** 1.2 -9.6*** -8.2*** -1.3 208
(3.0) (4.3) (3.1) (2.8) (1.1) <122>
67 years 7.2*** -3.7 -6.6*** -4.5** -1.6* 163
(2.4) (3.5) (2.3) (2.1) (1.0) <91>
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Notes: The table shows results of local linear RD regressions using a rectangular kernel and 12 months of bandwidth on each side of the
cut-off for each outcome (in $1,000). The sample consists of individuals employed by a firm with AFP affiliation 24 months before the
firm’s bankruptcy date who satisfied the initial AFP eligibility criteria (see details in Section 3.1). The sample includes bankruptcies between
2001–2010 and workers aged 59–61 years at the firm’s bankruptcy date. Earnings and benefits are measured in 2015 dollars (NOK/USD = 9).
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Table A.3: Placebo estimates of cumulative outcomes (in $1,000): Non-AFP bankruptcies
Mean [SD]
Initially All private
Outcome: RD estimate (ITT): ineligible sector workers
AFP benefits .8 1.8 4.4 35.3
(2.1) (2.1) [23.5] [59.4]
Labor market earnings 20.0 19.3 79.0 122.0
(23.5) (21.4) [104.0] [142.4]
Program substitution:
Total public transfers -6.1 -3.3 76.7 69.0
(16.2) (15.7) [83.2] [98.7]
• DI benefits -15.2 -11.0 40.0 25.1
(13.7) (12.8) [64.5] [53.6]
• Unemployment benefits 3.1 5.6 10.9 2.7
(5.8) (6.0) [26.8] [13.8]
Controls NO YES
Number of firms 372 372 201 48,451
Number of individuals 417 417 221 141,122
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Notes: The table shows results of local linear RD regressions using a rectangular kernel and 12 months of bandwidth on each side of the
cut-off for each outcome (in $1,000). Controls in the alternative specification include the variables used for balancing tests (see Appendix
Table A.1) and year fixed-effects. Placebo sample consists of individuals employed by a firm without AFP affiliation 24 months before the
firm’s bankruptcy date, but otherwise satisfied the initial AFP eligibility criteria (see details in Section 3.1). The sample includes bankruptcies
between 2001–2010 and workers aged 59–61 years at the firm’s bankruptcy date. Initially ineligible are defined as the sample to the left of
the cut-off. The comparison sample of all private sector workers includes individuals who were employed by a private sector firm when aged
57–59 years (excluding bankruptcies). Earnings and benefits are measured in 2015 dollars (NOK/USD = 9).
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Notes: The figures show the unconditional means of each pre-determined covariate for each monthly age-bin relative to cut-off. Each covariate
is measured 24 months before bankruptcy date. The black solid lines illustrate results of local linear RD regressions using a rectangular kernel
and 12 months of bandwidth on each side of the cut-off. The dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. Local DI rate and unemployment rates are measured at the municipality level. The share
of senior workers are defined as the share of (all) coworkers above 57 years (excluding self). The sample consists of individuals employed by
a firm with AFP affiliation 24 months before the firm’s bankruptcy date who satisfied the initial AFP eligibility criteria (see details in Section
3.1). The sample includes bankruptcies between 2001–2010 and workers aged 59–61 years at the firm’s bankruptcy date. Earnings and wealth
are measured in 2015 dollars (NOK/USD = 9).
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Figure A.2: RD estimates and bandwidth selection: Cumulative outcomes
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Notes: The figures illustrate the estimated ITT effect for each outcome (in $1,000) for each choice of bandwidth (indicated on the horizontal
axis). The ITT effects are estimated by RD regressions using a local linear regression and a rectangular kernel on each side of the cut-off. The
red vertical line represents the baseline bandwidth choice of 12 months. The dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors
are clustered at the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. The sample consists of individuals employed by a firm with AFP affiliation
24 months before the firm’s bankruptcy date who satisfied the initial AFP eligibility criteria (see details in Section 3.1). The sample includes
bankruptcies between 2001–2010 and workers aged 59–61 years at the firm’s bankruptcy date. Earnings and benefits are measured in 2015
dollars (NOK/USD = 9).
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Figure A.3: Labor market earnings effects over time (in $1,000) for alternative sample of workers
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Notes: The figures show separate ITT estimates of labor market earnings (in $1,000) for each month relative to bankruptcy date for the
sample of workers employed 12 months before bankruptcy (top graph) and 1 month before bankruptcy (bottom graph). The ITT effects are
estimated by local linear RD regressions using a rectangular kernel and 12 months of bandwidth on each side of the cut-off. Point estimates are
represented by the black solid line, and the dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The
sample consists of individuals employed by a firm with AFP affiliation 24 months before the firm’s bankruptcy date who satisfied the initial
AFP eligibility criteria (see details in Section 3.1). The sample includes bankruptcies between 2001–2010 and workers aged 59–61 years at
the firm’s bankruptcy date. Earnings are measured in 2015 dollars (NOK/USD = 9).
38








-18 -12 -6 0 6 12 18
AFP eligibility cut-off age (months)
 
     p-value density test: .151
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of age (in months; defined as in equation 1) around the individual eligibility cut-off. P-value is
calculated using the discrete density test of Frandsen (2017). The sample consists of individuals employed by a firm without AFP affiliation
24 months before the firm’s bankruptcy date, but otherwise satisfied the initial AFP eligibility criteria (see details in Section 3.1). The sample
includes bankruptcies between 2001–2010 and workers aged 59–61 years at the firm’s bankruptcy date.
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  RD estimate: .8 (2.1)
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  RD estimate: -15.2 (13.7)
Notes: The figures show unrestricted means for each age-bin of labor market earnings and social insurance benefit take-up in $1,000 between
62–67 years of age, and the estimated regression lines of local linear regressions with rectangular kernel densities and 12 months of bandwidth
on each side of the cut-off. The dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Placebo
sample consists of individuals employed by a firm without AFP affiliation 24 months before the firm’s bankruptcy date, but otherwise satisfied
the initial AFP eligibility criteria (see details in Section 3.1). The sample includes bankruptcies between 2001–2010 and workers aged 59–61
years at the firm’s bankruptcy date. Earnings and benefits are measured in 2015 dollars (NOK/USD = 9).
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Appendix B Old-age pension benefit calculation
In this Appendix, we outlay the details of how the old-age pension benefit levels are calculated in the
Norwegian pension system. Except for the “AFP top-up” of about $2,300, the AFP benefit calculation
was equivalent to this calculation. The old-age pension benefits consist of three main pillars: a guarantee
pension, an income-related pension and a defined-contribution employer-provided pension plan.
Guarantee pension Individuals who had resided in Norway for at least three years between ages 16–
66 were entitled to the minimum guarantee pension. However, the guarantee pension was pro-rata
cut with years of residence succeeding 40 years. A full guarantee pension in 2015 was approximately
$15,500, and the guarantee pension is indexed annually.24
Income pension The income pension was a mapping based on the 20 best years of income after
the introduction of Folketrygden in 1967.25 The mapping was based on a base level that we denote
G, which is set by the government and indexed annually. In 2015, 1G was approximately $10,000.
Essentially, accrual in a year was calculated as the income exceeding 1G. For instance, a person earning
5G accrued 4 in that year. Only years where the accrual exceeded the average of the 20 best years up
until that year would adjust the accrued level. The income pension on accrual was capped at 12G which
implied, in combination with a decreasing accrual rate for income exceeding a certain threshold, that the
replacement rate from the old-age pension system declined with income.26 In the years between 1967–
1991, the accrual rate of pension benefits was 45 percent of the resulting accrued number calculated as
above, while in the years 1992–2011, the accrual rate was 42 percent. The average of the 20 years with
the highest accrual numbers constituted the final number (sluttpoengtallet), which was multiplied by the
accrual rate for the number of years of accrual pre-1992 and post-1992, and finally the base amount G,
to determine the income pension level. As a minimum, the income pension yielded 1G, given 40 years
of residence (with similar pro-rata cut as the guarantee pension).27
Defined-contribution pension plan After 2006, employers had to make a mandatory minimum con-
tribution of 2 percent of earnings of their employees to a defined contribution pension plan. A defined
benefit scheme was allowed as an alternative, however the defined benefit plan had to be on at least the
same level as the expected benefits under the defined contribution plan. Contributions were mandatory
for income levels between 1G–12G. Benefits were paid out as life-long annuities from claiming age.
24Exchange rate NOK/USD=9. There were different levels depending on marital status and the labor market status of the
spouse.
25Folketrygden is the Norwegian law governing the social security system, known as the National Insurance Scheme. All
residents are automatically member of the National Insurance Scheme.
26For the years 1967–1992, years with income exceeding 8G only gave one-third accrual for the income exceeding 8G. For
instance, a person earning 9G would accrue 7.33 that year ((8−1)+1×0.33). After 1992, income exceeding 6G would only
give one third accrual. A person earning 9G would then get (6−1)+3×0.33 = 6.
27As an example, say an unmarried individual worked for 40 years, where 25 of those years were pre-1992. The person
had a smooth income for all those years equal to 6G, meaning that the average of the 20 best years gives an accrual of 5. The
person claimed old-age pension in 2015, giving approximately:
$10,000+(0.45×5×25/40×$10,000)+(0.42×5×15/40×$10,000) = $32,000
This benefit would be upward adjusted if it was lower than the minimum guarantee pension, which for 2015 was about $16,200
(at the regular level for married couples with one spouse claiming benefits and the other working or claiming DI).
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